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A Systems Approach 
to lntersubjectivity 
Rino Genovese 
If all knowledge were knowledge of the universe 
as a whole, there would be no knowledge. -
Bertrand Russell 
1. The question of intersubjectivity has a long history behind it; 
however, it is still an unsolved problem. It is by now widely 
accepted that the nature of any real philosophical question is such 
that it can be dissolved, not solved. It may be added that a prob-
lem ought at least to be exactly located if it is to be dissolved; but 
this is not even the case with intersubjectivity. A heap of different 
objects are covered by this heading, ranging between the criterion 
of intersubjective validity (in neopositivistic theory of knowledge, 
this takes the place of the old concept of truth as reciprocal ade-
quacy between subject and object) and the concept of mutual 
understanding in a hermeneutic theory of communication with its 
ethical consequences. As is well known, the concept of intersub-
jectivity reached sociology via Alfred Schutz (1962), especially 
through his reworking of Husserl's (1954) notion of Lebenswelt, 
this being under many respects analogous to Wittgenstein's (1953) 
Lebensform. 
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The contact point between these theories seems to me to be a 
negative, rather than a positive one: that is to say, none of them 
dares to question openly what all of them presuppose: the con-
cept of subject. This failure is probably pushed to the extreme in 
Habermas's Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1981), an 
attempt to combine all current theoretical approaches to the prob-
lem of intersubjectivity. Here subjects seem to arise almost spon-
taneously out of the interactive field, coming into existence 
through verbal language. The intersubjectivity of shared symbols 
and values inheres from the beginning in language, whose imma-
nent telos is that an agreement should be produced between sub-
jects who may be defined only through intersubjectivity itself. 
Such a circle, however, only conceals the theoretical vacuum 
where the notion of subject lies abandoned. 
This notion was last thoroughly scrutinized by Husserl. It is 
well known that the phenomenological analysis aims at grasping 
the nature of consciousness in its most minute details: to this 
effect, intersubjectivity is introduced in the first place through the 
notion of "monadological intersubjectivity" (Husserl, 1950), i.e., 
beginning with the closed dimension of consciousness within 
which the alter ego is posited by analogy. Later on, in order also to 
mitigate the virtually solipsistic character inherent in the monado-
logical approach, Husserl will lay stress on the world that is com-
mon to all, the Lebenswelt. In any case, the subject, or 
consciousness, is never questioned in the phenomenological theo-
ry despite extremely interesting analyses. In my opinion, howev-
er, a theory of intersubjectivity cannot avoid facing the problem of 
defining the subject: it must first of all be a theory of subjectivity. 
2. In order to define what is a subject, one has to describe the 
process by which it is constituted. In what sense may someone, 
or something, talk about itself as being a subject provided with 
memory, self-consciousness and all the other features which phi-
losophy has traditionally assigned to the subject? When begin-
ning to answer this question, a systems approach can make use of 
the distinction drawn between the observer and the system. If the 
problems of subjectivity, and the related one of intersubjectivity, 
have to do with the question of the observer, it follows that they 
are on the level of the theory of knowledge, i.e., not, for instance, 
on the level of ethics. The constitution of the subject pertains to 
the manner after which the system is observed. This relation is, of 
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course, itself ambiguous, in that the observer, as observed by 
another system, is himself a system. Saying that the constitution 
of the subject pertains to the relation between observer and sys-
tem implies that we should deal with observing a system that 
observes other systems. It can be seen that we are moving within 
the scope of a "second order" cybernetics (von Foerster, 1984). 
On which conditions, then, is it possible to call subject an 
observed and observing system? By laying stress on the condi-
tions, we turn the classical transcendental problem of the "condi-
tions of the possibility of experience" into the problem of the 
conditions of the possibility of the subject. The subject is seen 
there as the result of a process, or rather of a constrained set of 
processes. In other words, we need only assume the existence of 
cognitive processes (perceptions, beliefs, and so on) as processes 
that may in turn be observed and described. However, we will 
not go so far as to attribute these cognitive processes directly to a 
transcendentally structured subject, nor to an individual empiri-
cal mind; rather, we shall consider them as being part of 
Bateson's (1972) mind: short arcs of a wider circuits network. 
Thus we try to avoid the traditional fallacy met when talking 
about the subject, i.e., that of considering it as a wholly self-trans-
parent observer, one that cannot be observed, but can only self-
observe itself. On the contrary, we aim at observing, from a 
relatively external point of view, how short arcs of a circuit, i.e., 
partial cognitive processes, generate something like a self-con-
scious subject. 
The question is then: On which conditions may an observing 
system, that is, a certain set of cognitive processes, be called a sub -
ject? In order to get ready to answer this question, we must intro-
duce the concept of point of view. Like all cybernetical processes, 
cognitive processes are selective ones. Any selection process may 
be observed and described as triggered from any determined 
point. That is to say: the above-mentioned short arcs of a circuit 
may be cut after different ways. We shall call point of view the 
point where a selection process is triggered off: to an observer's 
eye, this is the point whence a given cognitive process starts. 
Thus the concept of point of view, as a tool in observing cognitive 
processes, refers to the way in which they are to be handled. 
Because only a cognitive process is able to observe and describe 
another cognitive process, the notion of point of view refers to the 
concept of self-observation of cognitive processes as a whole. If 
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the short arcs are never a whole circuit, self-observing of the cog-
nitive processes may only succeed by putting the partial segments 
together and letting them play with each other. However, each 
cognitive process - that is, each arc of the whole circuit-may be 
observed by cutting yet another arc, i.e., through the shifting of 
points of view. Any point of view refers to another point of view 
from which it can be observed. Thus the network of knowledge is 
progressively construed in a self-referential way. 
We may now apply the constructivist theory of knowledge 
(Morin, 1986; von Glasersfeld, 1987; Genovese, 1989) thus 
sketched to the subject itself. How can an observer attribute the 
features of the subject either to himself or to another? The subject 
is constituted by cognitive processes: that is to say, the subject 
should be understood as the possibility for given processes to 
return, as selective insistence of certain points of view as opposed 
to others. In other words, the subject is a set of points of view 
repeating itself. This definition is part of a theory of observation 
which differentiates, on the one hand, points of view returning as 
triggers of actual cognitive processes and, on the other hand, 
merely hypothetical points of view: these are considered, and 
then set aside, or else simply neutralized as triggers of possible 
observations. A set of points of view is a subject if it repeats itself; 
relatively stabilized cognitive processes are produced in relation 
to a point of view within its circle, and/ or in respect of an exter-
nal observer who may, of course, be a merely hypothetical one. 
3. From what has been said till now, it may be derived that the 
shifting of points of view is the crucial moment in the constitution 
of the subject: because of it, certain cognitive processes may be 
taken to be relatively stabilized, as distinguished from other pro-
cesses . Failing this play or shifting of perspective , nothing like a 
subject would appear; indeed, there would be no knowledge at 
all, as no term of comparison would be available. A set of points 
of view may only repeat itself, and stabilize certain cognitive pro-
cesses, if it is compared to others which do not repeat themselves. 
This in turn happens under an observer's eye: a subject may be 
defined as such within a shifting of points of view, outside or 
inside of its circle, which makes it identifiable by an observer, or 
even by itself in the process of self-observing. 
A subject is a subject on condition that a relatively stabilized 
set of points of view be cut out of the total network of cognitive 
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processes in the world. Cognitive comparisons are brought about 
through a shifting of points of view: on the ground of these com-
parisons, it becomes possible to decide what is a subject and what 
is not. Thus, any observer may attribute to itself, or another, the 
features of the subject. The notion of subject is twice observer-
dependent: first, because the subject is such for an observer; sec-
ond, because a subject is nothing else but an observing system 
whose ability to repeat its cognitive operations is recognized. 
The distinction between different kinds of cognitive process-
es is implied by the definition of the relation between the notions 
of observer and subject, as given above. Some cognitive processes 
are actually available, e.g., in computers and automata; on the 
contrary, others may only come up again through the play of vir-
tual points of view. An individual and self-conscious mind con-
stitutes itself whenever a set of points of view is able to find its 
selections again and again, not just by identifying itself with the 
other, and taking the other's role-this is the opinion of George H. 
Mead-but also by attributing a role to the other, i.e., through the 
construction of a term of comparison for its own repeatable iden-
tity. In my opinion, this constructivist moment, when the other is 
produced, is the salient feature of a systems approach to the prob-
lems of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. If the other were not 
there, one should make it up: only by comparing itself with points 
of view that are not its own, a set of points of view is established 
as a repeatable identity. This is proved by the function of memo-
ry, where actual points of view refer to merely virtual ones, those 
from the past, as if these were others; those that return are able to 
do so because others are excluded, as they are forgotten or 
repressed through a selective relation. The function of the other is 
then more general than the function of memory. Husserl thought 
memory provided the pattern from which the alter ego could be 
inferred: the other in an intersubjective relation was introduced 
on the analogy of the past ego, which is equally alien to the actual 
ego. Husserl aimed at finding the other immanent within the 
consciousness: here, however, it is the other who ensures the very 
possibility for memory, and therefore for consciousness, to exist. 
This is a consequence of the loss of the immediate notion of con-
sciousness; it also follows from the attempt at providing a 
description of its constitutive process. The function of the other 
enables the points of view to shift and compare themselves to 
others. This function is more general than that of memory 
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because it implies an ability to draw comparisons which operates 
in memory, too. Selectivity ensures that nothing may be taken as 
a term of comparison if not by excluding something else. 
Selectively again, memory stabilizes a subject by causing some-
thing to return, while leaving something else out. 
Within this theoretical frame a cognitive process-for 
instance, a belief-may be attributed to a subject only if it returns 
in relation to other beliefs which also return, but only as excluded 
ones. We may then draw a distinction between believed beliefs 
and unbelieved beliefs. A subject stabilizes itself in relation to 
something generally other. Also, the function of the other makes 
it possible to establish relations to this "other": it makes no differ-
ence whether these are relations of agreement or disagreement, 
aversion or indifference. 
What does matter is that terms of comparison should be 
available, so that there may be other possibilities against which 
one can measure itself. Other beliefs may even be only imagined 
ones, just fictions. 
4. There are remarkable consequences to intersubjectivity which 
derive from the notion of subjectivity sketched above. First of all, 
this notion is part of the theory of knowledge: it would be very 
difficult to build social and ethical theories upon it, as these need 
to assume the existence of shared symbols and values. On the 
contrary, the shifting of points of view and the comparison are 
possible precisely because not all symbols and values are shared. 
Sharing is a very special case of intersubjectivity, whereby circles 
of points of view establish habitual comparisons with other cir-
cles, on the ground of an actual or presumed agreement, so that 
particular cognitive operations of anticipation and forecasting 
may be obtained. The scientific community offers a well-known 
example. Through fixed, repeatable procedures an intersubjective 
standard is reached which on principle causes possible diver-
gences to be reduced, thus making future results foreseeable. 
However, not all existing beliefs are scientific ones, and it is 
by now well known that no cultural form can understand all cul-
tural forms. The tendency to closure in the different communica-
tive milieus, each cultural form presenting itself as exclusive of 
the others, when not as the best one, sees to it that there are differ-
ent ways to share values and symbols, all of them equally legiti-
mate. Such being the state of things, concepts like point of view, 
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shifting and comparison are not to be taken as regulating ideals and 
exhortations to openness, which would risk being utterly useless, 
but rather as the description of moments that are as it were neces-
sary in order that even a closure may be effected. If a belief or a 
cultural form does not see the others, this does not mean that it 
will not have a relation to them, be it a merely negative or neutral-
ly indifferent one; what it does mean is that the circle of its self-
observation, the circle of points of view available to it, generates a 
limited number of comparisons. No matter how hard one tries to 
increase the possibilities to shift one's points of view, to enlarge, 
so to say, one's horizons, these will always be limited to a certain 
degree. It is part of the principle of selection itself that something 
should be left out entirely, so that comparisons may be estab-
lished with something else. Should there be total knowledge, 
there would be no knowledge, as in that case there would be no 
perspective, no distinction between fore- and background, and all 
would shade off. 
Talking about intersubjectivity leads to a kind of perspec-
tivism, all the more radical in that it is aware of its being unavoid-
able. But if it is true that one cannot escape the relativity of 
perspectives, we can nevertheless describe the movement through 
which this relativity gets organized. In this sense relativism does 
by no means imply a conviction to theoretical powerlessness. The 
different perspectives pertain to meaningful contexts within 
which the shifting of points of view and the cognitive compar -
isons are possible by means of their very self-referential closure. 
Any observer is a subject in relation to others, if only in a negative 
way, when it establishes habitual comparisons which fix some 
cognitive processes: beliefs, for instance. The intervention of the-
ory in the field of belief appears therefore to open other possibili-
ties and soberly recalls the necessary limitations inherent in any 
perspective. 
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